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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Martin Edmo Ish appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily dismissing
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Mr. Ish contends that the district
court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with regard to
one of Mr. Ish’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues of material
fact as to whether counsel was ineffective.
In his post-conviction petition, Mr. Ish asserted that his defense counsel was
ineffective for requesting a jury instruction that misstated the law and lowered the
State’s burden of proof with regard to his possession of a controlled substance charge.
Because the requested jury instruction was given, and the jury convicted Mr. Ish of
possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Ish has shown defense counsel’s error was
prejudicial.
The petition was summarily dismissed by the district court without an evidentiary
hearing. The district court held that the instruction was correct and that Mr. Ish could
not raise a post-conviction claim that the jury instructions were incorrect based on
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996). However, such was error as Idaho precedent
allows this claim to be pursued in post-conviction and the appellate courts have found
deficient performance by counsel in several cases where the jury was erroneously
instructed. Therefore, the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on
the claim.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2012, Mr. Ish was charged with possession of methamphetamine for residual
traces of methamphetamine found in a three-inch long straw that was located in his
pants pocket.1 (Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 – p.134, L.2; R.39487, p.37.) At trial, defense
counsel requested a jury instruction on the elements of possession of a controlled
substance that included language that Mr. Ish “knew or should have known” that he
possessed methamphetamine. (R.39847, p.138.) The district court gave a modified
version of the instruction requested by defense counsel, and the jury found Mr. Ish guilty
of possession of a controlled substance.

(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.15-23; p.257, L.17 –

p.258, L.7.)
Mr. Ish was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and a persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. (R., p.5.) Mr. Ish was sentenced to twelve years,
with four years fixed. (R., p.5.) Mr. Ish appealed from the judgment. (R., p.5.) On
appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Ish’s conviction for the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement.

(State v. Martin Ish, Dkt. No. 39847, 2014

Unpublished Opinion No. 433, Idaho Court of Appeals, March 28, 2014; R., p.5.)
Mr. Ish was resentenced to seven years, with three years fixed. (R., p.241.)
On July 29, 2014, Mr. Ish filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter
alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting an erroneous jury instruction

Officer Eric Miller testified it was, based on his training and experience, a straw that
would be used for snorting some sort of drug. (Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.3-8.)

1
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that, Mr. Ish “knew or should have known that what was in that baggie was
methamphetamine.”2 (R., pp.6-120.)
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal with a supporting
brief in which the State addressed Mr. Ish’s claims. (R., pp.156-170.) In its motion for
summary dismissal, as for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State
generally argued that Mr. Ish had not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s
assistance was adequate and that all decisions were made with the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment, particularly where his counsel filed a motion to
suppress on which it prevailed, in part. (R., pp.168-69.) The State claimed that Mr. Ish
failed to establish all the essential elements for which he bore the burden of proof, and
the petition should be dismissed. (R., p.169.) The State also requested that the district
court take judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal file. (R., pp.170-171.)
In response, Mr. Ish filed a brief denying the State’s contentions made in the
motion to dismiss. (R., pp.152-155.)
Thereafter, the district court issued a written decision in which it dismissed
Mr. Ish’s post-conviction petition.3 (R., pp.238-249.)
The district court summarily dismissed all of the claims, including the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. (R., pp.244-248.) As for Mr. Ish’s claim that his counsel
Mr. Ish’s post-conviction petition alleged numerous evidentiary errors and errors by his
trial counsel which are not set forth herein. (R., pp.6-120.) Mr. Ish will instead focus on
the issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for requesting an erroneous jury instruction on the elements of
possession of a controlled substance.
3 Therein, the district court considered both the underlying criminal case as well as the
criminal appeal. (R., p.238.) For ease of reference, Mr. Ish shall refer to the transcript
of the September 8, 2011 trial from the underlying criminal case, as “Trial Tr.” and the
clerk’s record from the appeal as “R.39847.”
2
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was ineffective for erroneously recommending the “knew or should have known”
language in the jury instruction, the district court found the jury instruction telling the jury
Mr. Ish was guilty of possessing a controlled substance if he “knew or should have
known” the substance was methamphetamine was a correct statement of the law and
any claims as to the correctness of jury instructions, which could have been challenged
on appeal but were not, are waived pursuant to Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996).
(R., p.248.) The district court also found, as to all claims of ineffective assistance,
Mr. Ish did not show how he was prejudiced and how the outcome would have been
different. (R., p.248.) The court granted the motion for summary dismissal. (R., p.248.)
Thereafter, the district court entered a final judgment. (R., pp.250-251.)
Mr. Ish filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the
petition. (R., pp.252-255, 261-265.)

7

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Ish’s Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Ish’s Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ish established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions that

his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting a jury instruction which lowered the
prosecution’s burden of proof and was directly contradicted by Idaho case law.

In

support of his claims, Mr. Ish submitted evidence and a sworn affidavit. The district
court summarily dismissed Mr. Ish’s claim, finding that the instruction was correct, that a
claim of erroneous jury instructions may not be raised in post-conviction pursuant to
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996), and that Mr. Ish had not established prejudice or
how the outcome would have been altered.

However, the jury instruction was

erroneous, the facts of Cootz v. State are distinguishable, and Mr. Ish presented prima
facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this issue and
demonstrated a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the
trial would have been different. As such, Mr. Ish certainly should have been allowed an
evidentiary hearing on the claim, and the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed the post-conviction petition in its entirety.
B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying

criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,
456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil
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Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceedings
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim;” it “must be verified with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.” Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
The appellate court presumes that trial counsel was competent “and that trial tactics
were based on sound legal strategy.” State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 792 (1997). Trial
counsel's tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008).
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.”

Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.

“A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
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outcome.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

“The benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Id. at 686.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c). In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, the district court need not accept those
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.”

Cootz v.

State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996). However, if the petitioner presents some
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the
State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968). This is so even if the allegations
appear incredible on their face.

Id.

The district court is required to accept the

petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the petitioner’s
conclusion. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.
If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted to resolve the factual issues.
(Ct. App. 2002).

Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272

The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for

whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The inquiry performed is the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words,
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either
party” Id. at 250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must
be conducted. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008).
The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner “must be regarded as true” for
purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009). Any
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving
party.” Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Requesting An Erroneous Jury Instruction Which
Lowered The State’s Burden Of Proof
Mr. Ish asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance

of counsel on his post-conviction claims.

Mr. Ish asserted, inter alia, that his trial

counsel was deficient because counsel requested an erroneous jury instruction on the
element of possession, and the district court granted the request, and the jury found him
guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
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Mr. Ish was charged with possession of a controlled substance under I.C. § 372732(c)(1) which provides, in relevant part:
(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a
controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a
controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined
not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (R.39487, p.37).
Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime requiring that the
defendant knowingly possess the substance.

State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704

(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,
926 (1993). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, “[t]he purpose of the
intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent,
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior.” Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704.
Here, the State charged Mr. Ish with possessing methamphetamine in violation of
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1). (R.39487, p.37.) The pattern Idaho criminal jury
instruction (ICJI) for possession of a controlled substance provides that “[i]n order for
the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, the state must
prove each of the following: . . . the defendant either knew it was [name of substance] or
believed it was a controlled substance.”

(ICJI 403.)

Therefore, it was the State’s

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ish knew it was methamphetamine
or believed it was a controlled substance. Under this instruction, the jury could not
convict Mr. Ish if it found he did not know it was methamphetamine or some other
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controlled substance—even if the jurors believed he should have known it was
methamphetamine or some other controlled substance.
Nonetheless, the district court instructed the jury as follows regarding the
knowledge requirement:
4.
the defendant knew or should have known
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance.

it

was

(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.15-23 (emphasis added).)4
The district court thus instructed the jury on an incorrect legal standard. The
Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered a new trial in a similar case where the jury
relied upon an erroneous “knew or should have known” standard to establish the
defendant’s knowledge. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240-241 (1999).
In State v. Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in
giving jury instructions which stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of
possession of a controlled substance the State must prove that he “knew or should
have known” that the substance possessed was a controlled substance. 133 Idaho
237, 240-241 (1999). The Supreme Court held that this was error, as it allowed the jury
to convict the defendant using a negligence standard. Id. at 241. The Idaho Supreme

4

Defense counsel initially requested the jury instruction reading, in pertinent part:

4.

the defendant knew or should have known it was methamphetamine.

(R.39847, p.138 (emphasis added).) Near the end of trial, the prosecutor requested
additional language to add the words, “or believed it was a controlled substance” to Jury
Instruction No. 16. (Trial Tr., p.235, L.9 – p.236, L.24.) Defense counsel objected to
the additional words, but the district court agreed with the prosecutor and added the
language. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.4-24.) Notably, the incorrect language of “knew or
should have known” was still included in the final version.
14

Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case with instructions for a
new trial. Id. at 243.
Here, the district court’s instruction asked the jury to apply the incorrect legal
standard to establish the element of knowledge and thereby lowered the State’s burden
of proof. The jury was left with the impression that it could convict Mr. Ish even if it
found that he did not realize there was methamphetamine or another controlled
substance inside the straw, but “should have known” what was in the straw. Thus, the
jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find Mr. Ish guilty of
possession of a controlled substance without finding that he knew what was in the
straw.
In granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court found that
the “knew or should have known” instruction was a correct statement of the law and
Mr. Ish did not raise this issue on appeal. (R., p.248.) Further, the district court found,
under Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (Ct. App. 1996), that claims as to the correctness
of jury instructions which could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, are
waived and not to be considered in post-conviction proceeding. (R., p.248.) However,
Cootz was a case in which the petitioner claimed that three jury instructions misled him
to believe that only one sentence enhancement was being sought. Cootz, 129 Idaho
364. Since Cootz, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial attorney was deficient
for not objecting to an incorrect jury instruction. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567 (2010);
see also Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding defendant met
his burden in showing his trial attorney was deficient for not objecting to the jury
instruction that erroneously defined “malice”).
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In Mr. Ish’s case, where his counsel requested an erroneous jury instruction that
had been determined erroneous by Idaho case law as far back as 1999, this constituted
deficient performance and controlling precedent allowed such a claim to be raised in an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction case. Thus, the district
court’s holding that the instruction was a correct statement of the law and that Cootz
barred such a claim was erroneous.
Furthermore, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings. Because of the error, the jury was left with the impression that it
could convict Mr. Ish even if it found that he did not know what was in the straw. Had
this jury been properly instructed, it is likely this jury would have also been unable to
convict Mr. Ish of the offense.
Tactical and strategic decisions by trial counsel will not be second-guessed and
“cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382–
83, 247 P.3d 582, 609–10 (2010). In the absence of a showing that counsel was
unprepared, ignorant of the relevant law, or exhibited any other shortcoming capable of
objective evaluation, the reviewing court will presume that the decision was one driven
by tactical or strategic decision making.

Crawford v. State, __ P.3d __, 2016 WL

1358103, *5 (Idaho Apr. 6, 2016).
To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694.

A reasonable probability is defined as “a
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86 (2011).
However, failure to object or bring to the district court’s attention the fact that it
was incorrectly instructing the jury and simultaneously lowering the prosecution’s
burden of proof was clearly “ignorance of the relevant law,” as discussed in Shackelford.
Not only was this error of counsel unreasonable, it had an adverse effect on the
defense. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. It was apparent from the jury instruction that
the jury could convict Mr. Ish based on an improper standard of knowledge. Where the
jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Ish guilty based on a negligence standard, this
removed the burden on the State to prove that Mr. Ish knew or believed the substance
in the straw was a controlled substance.
Defense counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous jury instruction can be
likened to the facts of McKay v. State. In McKay, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
McKay’s trial attorney was objectively deficient for failing to object to jury instructions
which omitted the only disputed element in the case, and there was “no conceivable
tactical justification for trial counsel’s failure to object.” 148 Idaho 567, 572 (2010). The
Court vacated the summary dismissal of Mr. McKay’s application, finding that he had
established a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance; thus, Mr. McKay was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Similarly, in Sheahan, the jury was instructed on a definition of “malice” that
Idaho precedent had held was inapplicable long before the defendant’s trial. The Court
of Appeals noted that, in State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 713 (1970), the Court held that
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the section 18–101 definition of malice was not to be used in the instructions in a
murder case. The Court held that “the incorrect expansion of the definition of malice in
the jury instruction's second paragraph improperly lowered the State's burden of proof
on that element of the offense.” Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 105. As a result, Mr. Sheahan
had shown that his attorney’s performance was not “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” where he failed to object to the faulty
instruction. Id. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
Here, trial counsel made an egregious mistake.

Asking the district court to

erroneously instruct the jury thereby negating one of the elements the State was
required to prove, could not fall within the ambient of reasonable representation and
caused prejudice to Mr. Ish where this Court presumes that a jury followed the jury
instructions given by the trial court in reaching its verdict. See State v. Abdullah, 158
Idaho 386, 445 (2015).
This instruction was particularly prejudicial in a residue case, where the drug
amount may be so small as to be invisible to the naked eye. As the Idaho Court of
Appeals held, in State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152 (Ct. App. 1999):
The greater the amount of a controlled substance found in a defendant's
possession, the greater the inference of knowledge and control. However,
under circumstances where the quantity of a controlled substance
possessed by a defendant is de minimis and there is no other
circumstantial evidence of possession, the inference of knowledge and
control is significantly diminished.
Id.

(internal citations omitted).

Thus, asking the jury to convict on a negligence

standard was problematic when there was just residue in the straw.
Had an evidentiary hearing been conducted, Mr. Ish would have established that
the State’s possession case suffered from a lack of direct evidence that Mr. Ish knew
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there was methamphetamine residue in the straw.

Regardless of whether

methamphetamine was found in his urine (Trial Tr., p.166, L.23 – p.167, L.3; State’s
Trial Exhibit 3), Mr. Ish could have obtained a straw with methamphetamine residue that
he was not aware of and/or could not even see. Thus, it is apparent that use of the
negligence standard becomes problematic and prejudicial as Mr. Ish denied using
methamphetamine and no methamphetamine (other than the residue in the straw) was
found on his person or in the car.5 (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.9-16.) Further, Mr. Ish did not
admit to having recently possessed or consumed methamphetamine, and in fact he said
it had been a couple of months since he had last used it.6 (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.13-16.)
In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that there was a tremendous likelihood
that the jury convicted Mr. Ish on a negligence standard in finding him guilty of
possession of a controlled substance where he “should have known” the identity of the
substance in the straw.
As such, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for requesting the
erroneous jury instruction negating one of the elements the State was required to prove,
and his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland, at 686.
At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Ish needed to show there existed a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the

The jury was instructed not to consider the syringes that were found in the vehicle.
(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.20-25; p.127, Ls.3-11.)
6 While the jury heard that Mr. Ish’s urine contained, inter alia, methamphetamine, there
was no testimony as to how long methamphetamine takes to dissipate from urine once
it has been ingested. (Trial Tr., p.164, L.17 – p.209, L.5.)
5
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proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Strickland, at 686. He sufficiently established that he was
entitled to a hearing where he substantiated his allegations with admissible evidence.
Mr. Ish established that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether his
counsel was deficient and there was a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient
conduct, the result of the trial would have been different.

Thus, the district court’s

dismissal of all of Mr. Ish’s claims was error.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ish respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of his
post-conviction petition with respect to the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective
for requesting an erroneous jury instruction which lowered the State’s burden of proof at
trial, and remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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